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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
OF iDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)

NO. 40525

)

ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2009-11603

V.

)

MICHAEL FRANCIS MOORE,

)
)
)

)

Defendant-Appellant.

________ )

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Michael Francis Moore asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of
the Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 479 (Ct. App. April 25, 2014) (hereinafter,
Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his Judgment of Conviction, was
in conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
because the Court of Appeals decision did not properly consider whether the existing
mental health evaluations and reports relied upon by the district court were sufficient to
comply with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On

shoplifting
Mr.

morning of June 25, 2009, law enforcement officials responded
report.

(Presentence

Investigation

Report (hereinafter,

a

PSl), 1 p.2.)

was intoxicated and had shoplifted a six pack of Mike's Hard Lemonade 2

from a drugstore.

(PSI, p.2.) As Mr. Moore was leaving the store, he struck a loss

prevention specialist who tried to detain him. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Moore was charged by
Information with one count of burglary, one count of petit theft, and one count of simple
battery. 3 (R., pp.24-25.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Moore pied guilty to the burglary charge and
the other charges were dismissed. (12/01/09 Tr.,

L.s.2-13;

, pp.39-40, 41-47.)

Although the terms of the plea agreement provided that the State

to recommend

probation, the plea agreement

provided that the State's recommendation would be

conditioned upon, inter alia, the defendant having no failures to appear.

(12/01/09

Tr., p.3, Ls.8-12; R., pp.42-47.) The district court ordered a PSI and a substance abuse
evaluation prior to sentencing. (12/01/09 Tr., p.14, L.8-p.15, L.1.)
Mr. Moore failed to appear at sentencing and the district court issued an arrest
warrant. (R., pp.48-50.)

Mr. Moore was arrested on the warrant.

(R., p.50.) The

sentencing hearing was continued several times to allow Mr. Moore sufficient time to

1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file containing
the PSI, and all included attachments. These documents will hereinafter be described
as the "PSI" for ease of reference.
2 Mike's Hard Lemonade is an alcoholic beverage.
3 Mr. Moore was initially charged with a single count of robbery (R., pp.6-7), but the
robbery charge was subsequently amended to burglary and two new crimes were
added-petit theft and misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.17-18.)

2

the

.4

(3/30/10 Tr., p.3,

Mr. Moore's counsel advised

0.) During one such hearing on March 23,

10,

district court that, at the time of the incident, Mr. Moore

was experiencing symptoms of his mental illness and, based on a recent conversation
with him

the jail, she believed that his mental health issues likely played a "very big

role" in the incident. (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-9.) Defense counsel asked the court to
order a mental health evaluation.

(3/23/10 Tr., p:10, Ls.13-16.)

The district court

reviewed Mr. Moore's mental health history contained in the records attached to the PSI
and noted that:
\Nell, a pure evaluation
I have the benefit of the report from
28 th of '05, the discharge, which lays
lntermountain hospital of
diagnosis on Axis I with schizoaffective disorder with alcohol and
abuse, along with some other things.

And then we have a psychiatric evaluation that was done by Saint
Alphonsus on
I love the way they hid the dates of these things. Well,
it doesn't read the same,
again, this is in August of '08. There is a
necessarily, as a court-ordered evaluation, but I think it tells me what I'm
going to find out from a court-ordered evaluation, that the defendant does
have a history of schizophrenic-type mental illness.
So I'm not inclined to continue this for mental health - I mean, the records
go back - I was just trying to remember how far back they went. And they
go back clear to 2002. I'm looking at one in January of '04 where he
presents at the emergency department with histories of hearing voices
and definitely psychotic state. So, Counsel, I'm not inclined to [order a
mental health evaluation].
(3/23/10Tr., p.11, L.8-p.12, L.3.)
At the sentencing hearing the State asked to be released from its obligations
under the plea agreement, as Mr. Moore had failed to appear for his sentencing

4

Mr. Moore advised the court that he does not read very well and needed additional
time to review the PSI. (PSI, p.56.)

3

hearing. 5

(3/30/10 Tr., p.3, Ls.3-18.)

The

did not object,

asked that

Mr. Moore be placed on probation with mental health and
(R., pp.59-60; 3/30/10 Tr., p.7, L.24

treatment.

p.8, L.15.)

The district court imposed upon Mr. Moore a sentence of five years, with one
year fixed. (3/30/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-3; R., pp.61-63, 72-74.) Thereafter, Mr. Moore filed
a timely I.C.R. 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence.

(R., pp.70-71.)

Although

Mr. Moore provided new information for the district court to consider in support of his
I.C.R. 35 motion for leniency, the district court denied Mr. Moore's motion. (R, pp.8688.)
After a post-conviction action, the district court
Conviction on November 19, 201

thereby restoring Mr.

the Judgment of
right to appeal.

(R., pp.90-91.) On November 29, 2012, Mr. Moore filed a notice of appeal timely from
the re-entered Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.92-94.)
On appeal, Mr. Moore asserted that the district court erred in failing to order a
mental health evaluation of Mr. Moore prior to sentencing.

Mr. Moore also contends

that the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his sentence in light of
Mr. Moore's mental health issues and other mitigating factors, as well as the additional
information submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion.
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court. (Opinion,
p.1.) Judge Melanson's lead opinion 6 found that the issue of whether an evaluation

Mr. Moore was homeless and "living on the streets" for more than a month before he
failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. (PSI, p.13.)
6 The lead opinion, authored by Judge Melanson, was not the majority opinion. Judge
Lansing, who concurred in the result, wrote separately. Judge Gutierrez joined Judge
5

4

should have

to I

§ 1

was

for appellate

review where counsel requested an evaluation under a different statute. (Opinion,

)

Judge Melanson opined that Mr. Moore failed to articulate below the specific grounds
argued on appeal, and the basis for the specific grounds argued on appeal was not
apparent from the context of the argument made below. (Opinion, p.2.) Thus, the lead
opinion of the Court concluded that the precise issue argued on appeal was not
preserved below, and Mr. Moore was unable to satisfy the first prong of the Perry
fundamental error standard.

(Opinion, pp.2-3.)

Judge Lansing's majority opinion

concurred in the result, but did not agree with the lead opinion's
issue raised on appeal was not preserved for

that the

(Opinion, p.4.)

opinion concluded that the district court correctly determined that

The majority

new evaluation was

not necessary in light of the extensive information on Mr. Moore's mental health that
was already before the district court. (Opinion, p.4.)
Mr. Moore timely filed a Petition for Review.

Lansing's opinion only. Thus, Judge Lansing's concurrence was actually the majority
opinion.
5

ISSUE
Is the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming Mr. Moore's Judgment of Conviction in
conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of
Appeals in that the decision did not properly consider whether the existing mental health
evaluations and reports relied upon by the district court were sufficient to comply with
the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522?

6

ARGUMENT
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Moore's Judgment Of
Conviction Is In Conflict With Applicable Decisions Of the Idaho Supreme Court And
The Idaho Court Of Appeals In That The Decision Did Not Properly Consider Whether
The Existing Mental Health Evaluations And Reports Relied Upon By The District Court
Were Sufficient To Comply With The Requirements Of I.C. § 19-2522

A

Introduction
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals erroneously determined that the

district court was not required to order a new evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, in
contravention of Idaho statute and established case law.

Both the plain language of

§ 19-2522 and Idaho case law make clear that once the record reflected that

Moore had a substantial history of serious mental illness such
condition would

his mental

a significant factor at sentencing, the district court was mandated to

order a psychological evaluation unless an evaluation under I.C. § 1

had been

ordered and the resulting report satisfied the requirements of I.C. §19-2522(3). Instead,
the district court relied on prior evaluations and reports prepared anywhere from 2-27
years prior to Mr. Moore's sentencing; however, these reports and evaluations fell far
short of the requirements mandated by I.C. § 19- 2522. 7

B.

The Objection By Trial Counsel Properly Preserved Mr. Moore's Issue On Appeal
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals is somewhat confusing, as the judge in the

minority, Judge Melanson, authored the lead opinion.

(Opinion, pp.1-4.)

Judge

Melanson's opinion found the issue of whether the district court erred in failing to order

At the time of Mr. Moore's sentencing, the statute did provide for an exception-where
an evaluation under I.C. § 19-2524 has been ordered and the resulting report satisfies
the requirements of I.C. §19-2522(3). I.C. § 19-2522(6). Such is not the case here, as
the report ordered pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 analyzed only Mr. Moore's substance
abuse. (PSI, pp.22-31.)
7

7

I.C. § 1

an

whether the district court
(Opinion, pp.1

was not preserved and, thus, his opinion did not
in refusing to order a psychological evaluation.

) The majority of the Court correctly held that the issue had been

below, but found that the previous years' reports and evaluations were
sufficient. (Opinion, p.4.)
In State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court held, "[f]or
an objection to be preserved for appellate review, either the specific ground for the
objection must be clearly stated ... or the basis of the objection must be apparent form
the context." Id. at 277. As the majority of the Court correctly determined, the issue of
the district court erred in denying Mr. Moore's motion for further evaluation of
his

health was properly preserved.

Defense counsel, after advising that her

client was experiencing symptoms of his mental illness when he committed the crime,
requested a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524. (3/23/10 Tr., p.10,
Ls.13-16.) Although Mr. Moore never requested an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation by citing
to that specific section in the Idaho Code, the ground for the objection was clearly
stated-that Mr. Moore was experiencing the symptoms of his mental illness such that it
would be a significant factor at sentencing. Thus the basis of the objection was clear
from the context within which the objection was made, and the district court had ample
opportunity to consider the request for a court-ordered evaluation of Mr. Moore's mental
health.
While "Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for appeal
through an objection at trial, State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), in this case, trial
counsel did object to the district court going forward with sentencing without an

8

additional, court-ordered evaluation of Mr. Moore's mental illness, and counsel's
explanation of the basis for

request

to notify the district court that

Mr. Moore's mental illness was serious and would be a significant factor at sentencing.
(3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-16.) In Peny, the Court explained that the fundamental error
rule serves to induce the timely raising of claims and objections, which gives the trial
court the opportunity to consider and resolve them. Id. at 224. In Mr. Moore's case, the
error was objected to and therefore the Perry fundamental error analysis is inapplicable.
Here, counsel asked the district court to order an evaluation after she indicated that
Mr. Moore's mental illness "probably played a very big role in this incident." (3/23/10
Tr., p.1

6.) The district court was thus on notice that Mr. Moore's mental illness

would be a significant factor

sentencing, and had ample opportunity to consider the

request and resolve the issue by ordering an evaluation of Mr. Moore under I.C. § 1
2522.

C.

The Opinion Did Not Properly Consider Whether The Existing Mental Health
Evaluations And Reports Relied Upon By The District Court Were Sufficient To
Comply With The Requirements Of I.C. § 19-2522
The lead opinion of the Court of Appeals failed to reach the merits of Mr. Moore's

claim-whether the district court erred by refusing to order a psychological evaluation
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522.

(Opinion, pp.1-3.)

The concurring opinion-which is

actually the majority opinion-did reach the merits of Mr. Moore's claim and held that
the district court did not err because Mr. Moore's prior evaluations were sufficient, but
did not offer any analysis as to why it found that the old evaluations were sufficient, and
it did not specifically address the sufficiency of the old evaluations in light of the
requirements contained in I.C. § 19-2522. (Opinion, p.4.) Although the statute at issue

9

was amended in 2012 to allow a district court

other mental health

Mr. Moore was sentenced in 2010, prior to the amendment. !.C. § 1
In 2010, the statute provided that only a report prepared pursuant to I.C. § 19could be used, in certain circumstances, in lieu of a new report:
If a mental health examination of the defendant has previously
conducted pursuant to section 19-2524, Idaho Code, and a report of such
examination has been submitted to the court, and if the court determines
that such examination and report provide the necessary information
required by this section, including all of the information specified in
subsection (3) of this section, then the court may consider such
examination and report as the examination and report required by this
section and need not order an additional examination of the defendant's
mental condition.
I.C. § 19-2522(6) (2010). However, the 2012 statutory amendment broadened the type
of suitable mental health examinations permitted under the statute:
If a mental health examination of the defendant has previously been
conducted, whether pursuant to section 19-2524, Idaho Code, or for any
other purpose, and a report of such examination has been submitted to
the court, and if the court determines that such examination and report
provide the necessary information required in subsection (3) of this
section, and the examination is sufficiently recent to reflect the defendant's
present mental condition, then the court may consider such prior
examination and report as the examination and report required by this
section and need not order an additional examination of the defendant's
mental condition.
I.C. § 19-2522(6) (emphasis added) ( See 2012 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 225, § 3, p.611,
effective July 1, 2012). 8
Idaho Code Section 19-2522(6) provides that the district court may forgo ordering
a new psychological evaluation where, "a mental health examination of the defendant
has previously been conducted pursuant to section 19-2524, Idaho Code" and the
report contains "the necessary information required by this section, including all of the

8

All further citations to I.C. § 19-2522 will be to the 2010 version.
10

information specified in subsection (3) of this section."

§ 19-2522(6).

information statutorily required to be contained in the evaluation is not just what
illness the defendant had been previously diagnosed with, but also:
(a) A description of the nature

the examination;

(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of
the defendant;

(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect
and level of functional impairment;
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the
defendant's mental condition;
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or
nontreatment;
(f) A consideration of the risk
create for the public if at

danger which

defendant

I.C. § 19-2522(3).
The majority Opinion of the Court of Appeals succinctly concluded, "the district
court correctly determined that a new psychological evaluation was not needed in view
of the extensive information already before the district court concerning Moore's mental
health condition and history." (Opinion, p.4.) However, the Court failed to offer any
analysis of whether the information available to the district court at sentencing complied
with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). Thus, it appears the majority opinion may
have improperly relied on the 2012 amended version of the statute, which allows for use
of prior reports provided certain conditions are met. Because at the time of Mr. Moore's
sentencing, only an evaluation conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524, provided certain
conditions were met, could be used in place of a new psychological evaluation under

11

§ 1

Court improperly found

the evaluations

before the

district court were sufficient. I.C. § 19-2522(6).
The limited information before the district court at sentencing in this case was not
an adequate substitute for an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation, particularly where Mr. Moore's
mental health issues were raised both prior to his guilty plea, several times prior to
sentencing, and during sentencing.

The August 2008 evaluation performed through

Saint Alphonsus did not meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522.

Although the

substance abuse evaluation mentioned Mr. Moore's mental health, it did not inform the
court on all of the I.C. § 19-2522 factors, such as consideration of whether treatment is
available for a defendant's mental condition, the relative risks and benefits of treatment
or nontreatment, and the risk of danger that the defendant presents to the public. (PSI,
pp.22-31.) Therefore, there never was a mental health evaluation which complied with
the then-existing requirements of I.C. § 19-2522.

The Court of Appeals' Opinion is

inconsistent with the requirements of the statute as the majority opinion concluded that
the district court could rely on the other mental health information concerning
Mr. Moore's mental health condition and history, in lieu of ordering a psychological
evaluation. The Court thus erroneously affirmed the decision by the district court.
In holding that the district court could rely on the "extensive information" in the
PSI regarding Mr. Moore's mental health, the Court impliedly found that Mr. Moore's
mental health was a significant factor at sentencing.
While the decision to order a psychological evaluation lies within the sentencing
court's discretion, a psychological evaluation is mandatory under some circumstances,
such as when "there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a

12

significant

sentencing," whereupon "the court shall appoint

one (1)

psychologist to examine and report upon the mental condition of

psychiatrist or

the defendant." I.C. § 19-2522(1) (emphasis added); State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364,
(Ct. App. 2008).
The legal standards governing the district court's decision whether to order a
psychological evaluation and report are contained in I.C. §19-2522:
(1) If there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will
be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court
shall appoint
least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to
examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant.
§ 19-2522( 1 ).
The district court has discretion to deny a defendant's request for a psychological
evaluation.

v. Collins, 144 Idaho 408, 409 (Ct. App. 2007). However, with any

discretionary decision, the district court must act within the bounds of its discretion,
consistent with applicable legal principles.

State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 823

(Ct. App. 2008). The applicable legal standard for reviewing a district court's decision to
deny a psychological evaluation is governed by I.C. § 19-2522(1 ). State v. Craner, 137
Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 2002).
A psychological evaluation is mandatory if "there is reason to believe the mental
condition of the defendant would be a significant factor at sentencing." State v. Hanson,
152 Idaho 314, 318 (2012).

In Hanson, the defendant requested a psychological

evaluation prior to sentencing. Hanson, 152 Idaho at 318. The district court denied the
request, finding, inter alia, that a psychological evaluation was not necessary because it
did not believe that the additional information provided by a psychological evaluation
would be helpful at sentencing.

Id.

The Idaho Supreme Court granted review and

13

remanded the case so that a psychological evaluation could be ordered. Id.

318,

In so doing, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a "defendant's mental condition is
a significant factor at sentencing if the sentencing court is aware of a defendant's
lengthy history of serious mental illness." Id. at 319-320.
The Court found that

record demonstrated that the defendant's mental

condition was a significant factor at sentencing based on: (1) a substantial history of
mental illness, including past hospitalizations for mental health issues; (2) Mr. Hanson's
erratic and unusual behaviors while in custody; (3) the comments made by the district
court at sentencing regarding

that "certain mental factors" existed and that the

defendant did need psychological treatment;

(4) at sentencing the district court

recommended various treatments and therapies for the defendant during his period of
incarceration and noted that he should receive a psychological evaluation. Id. at 321.
The Hanson Court found that the record demonstrated that the defendant's mental
condition was a significant factor at sentencing and reversed the district court's denial of
Hanson's request for a psychological evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 and
remanded the case for further proceedings.

Id. at 319-320.

Here, like in Hanson,

Mr. Moore's mental health condition was a significant factor at sentencing, and the facts
of this case are similar to those in Hanson.
Like the district court in Hanson, the district court in Mr. Moore's case knew that
Mr. Moore was suffering from a serious mental illness which caused him to hear voices
and be in a psychotic state.

(3/23/10 Tr., p.11, L.25 - p.12, L.2.) The district court

14

that

Moore's mental health

(3/23/10 Tr., p.11,

)

Mr.

dated back as far as 2002. 9

had previously undergone

psychiatric

hospitalizations for mental illness. (PSI, p.150.) The record is replete with indications
that Mr. Moore suffered from severe mental health issues and those issues were
him on the date of the

Mr. Moore's defense counsel, after speaking

to him at the jail while he was reviewing his PSI, revealed that, "at the time of this
incident, Mr. Moore was experiencing hallucinations, symptoms of his schizophrenia ...
[a]nd it has come to my attention that his mental health issues probably played a very
big role in this incident." (3/23/10 Tr., p.9, L.14 - p.10, L.9.) Notably, when Mr. Moore
was seen in 2003, he spoke to his treatment provider about his auditory and visual
hallucinations and expressed his concern that, because of his hallucinations, he did not
know what was real and what was not real and that he feared that he was going to end
up hurting someone. (PSI, p.192.) In 2009, in this case, Mr. Moore backhanded a store
clerk who was trying to stop him from shoplifting. (PSI, p.2.)
However, the district court concluded that a court-ordered evaluation was not
necessary because it already knew, based upon a past evaluation, that Mr. Moore had
a history of schizophrenic-type mental illness.

(3/23/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.14-21.)

Yet,

knowledge of a past diagnosis is not a sufficient substitute for all of the information
contained in an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation. Additionally, like in Hanson, the district court
commented

at

sentencing

regarding

Mr.

Moore's

mental

health problems,

"I

acknowledge that you have mental health problems. But there are people with mental
health problems that don't commit crimes. They get on their medicines and they stay on

The records actually go back as far as 1983, when Mr. Moore was a juvenile. (PSI,
pp.71-79.)
9
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them." (3/30/10

., p.11, Ls.9-1

) The district court then imposed its sentence of five

with one year fixed, telling Mr. Moore that the
to get stabilized on your medication and

was "in light of your need

some structure." (3/30/10 Tr., p.11, L.25 -

p.12, L.5.)
Mr. Moore's mental health should have been a significant mitigating factor at
sentencing, but the district court may have viewed Mr. Moore's acts attributable to his
mental health condition as aggravating facts suggesting that Mr. Moore could not be
compliant on probation. At sentencing, the district court commented on the fact that
Mr. Moore failed to appear for his sentencing hearing: "And for whatever reason you
just decided not to show. It wasn't like you committed some other big crime or fled the
country or something. You were just back on the street drinking and getting in trouble."
(3/30/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.19-23.) Had the district court obtained a mental health evaluation
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, the court could have referred to the evaluation to assist the
court in determining the risk Mr. Moore posed to the community.
In sum, because the district court considered Mr. Moore's mental health when
sentencing him, thus indicating that Mr. Moore's mental health was a significant factor at
sentencing, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Moore's request and refused to
order a mental health evaluation pursuant I.C. § 19-2522.

The Court of Appeals

erroneously affirmed the decision of the district court by disregarding the statutory
requirements for an evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. Mr. Moore asks this Court to
grant review of all of the issues on appeal. 10

10

The issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Moore's
I.C.R. 35 motion was not briefed herein, as it was fully briefed in Appellant's Brief.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Moore respectfully requests that his

for Review

granted and that

this Court vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court
for a mental health evaluation

a new sentencing hearing.

DATED this 2ih day of June, 2014.

SALLY J/COOLEY
Deput{State Appellate Public Defender

(Appellant's Brief, pp.13-17.) Mr. Moore's arguments regarding this issue are hereby
incorporated by reference.
17
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